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Abstract
We prove an Ω(d lg n/(lg lgn)2) lower bound on the dynamic cell-probe complexity of sta-
tistically oblivious approximate-near-neighbor search (ANN) over the d-dimensional Hamming
cube. For the natural setting of d = Θ(lgn), our result implies an Ω˜(lg2 n) lower bound, which is
a quadratic improvement over the highest (non-oblivious) cell-probe lower bound for ANN. This
is the first super-logarithmic unconditional lower bound for ANN against general (non black-
box) data structures. We also show that any oblivious static data structure for decomposable
search problems (like ANN) can be obliviously dynamized with O(lg n) overhead in update and
query time, strengthening a classic result of Bentley and Saxe (Algorithmica, 1980).
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1 Introduction
The nearest-neighbor search problem asks to preprocess a dataset P of n input points in some
d-dimensional metric space, say ℜd, so that for any query point q in the space, the data structure
can quickly retrieve the closest point in P to q (with respect to the underlying distance metric).
The r-near-neighbor problem is a relaxation of the nearest-neighbor problem, which requires, more
modestly, to return any point in the dataset within distance r of the query point q (if any exists).
The distance parameter r is typically referred to as the radius. Efficient algorithms (either offline
or online) for both the nearest-neighbor and r-near-neighbor problems are only known for low-
dimensional spaces [Cla88, Mei93], as the only known general solutions for these problems are the
naive ones: either a brute-force search requiringO(dn) time (say, on a word-RAM), or precomputing
the answers which requires prohibitive space exponential in d. This phenomenon is commonly
referred to as the “curse of dimensionality” in high-dimensional optimization. This obstacle is
quite problematic as nearest-neighbor search primitives are the backbone of a wide variety of
industrial applications as well as algorithm design, ranging from machine learning [SDI06] and
computer vision [HS12], to computational geometry [CDH+02], spatial databases [Tya18] and signal
processing [MPL00] as some examples.
To circumvent the “curse of dimensionality”, a further relaxation of the near(est)-neighbor
problem was introduced, resorting to approximate solutions, which is the focal point of this paper.
In the (c, r)-approximate-near-neighbor problem (ANN), the data structure needs to return any
point in P that is distance at most cr from the query point q, assuming that there exists at least
one data point in P that is within distance at most r from the query. If all points in the data set
P are distance greater than cr from the query point q, no point will be reported. In other words,
(c, r)-ANN essentially asks to distinguish the two extreme cases where there exists a point in P
which is at most r-close to the query point q, or all points in P are at ≥ cr-far from q. Perhaps
surprisingly, the geometric “gap” in this promise version of the problem turns out to be crucial,
and indeed evades the “curse of dimensionality”. A long and influential line of work in geometric
algorithms based on locality sensitive hashing (or, LSH, for short) techniques [IM98, Pan06] show
that the search time for this promise problem (under various ℓp norms) can be dramatically reduced
from ∼ n to nδ (for a small constant δ depending on r and c) at the cost of a mild space overhead
of n1+ǫ or even npoly lg n in the static setting. Interestingly, these upper bounds extend to the
more challenging and realistic dynamic setting where points in the dataset arrive online, yielding a
dynamic data structure with poly lg n update time and nδ query time [Pan06]. For a more detailed
exposition of the state-of-the-art on ANN, we refer the reader to the following surveys [AI06, And09].
On the lower bound side, progress has been much slower. While there has been a consid-
erable amount of work on the limits of ANN in black-box models of computation with “no-
coding” assumptions (e.g., [BV02, KL05]), the highest unconditional lower bound to date is the
Ω(d/ lg(sw/nd)) query time lower bound for any static data structure by Wang and Yin [WY14]
as well as Yin [Yin16], extending previous results of [PT06, ACP08, PTW08, PTW10], where s
denotes the data structure’s storage in cells and w is the word size in bits. This is also the highest
cell-probe lower bound to date in the dynamic setting – the aforementioned bound implies that any
(randomized) dynamic data structure for ANN with fast (poly lg n) update time must have Ω˜(d)
query time. This is in contrast to typical data structure problems, where online lower bounds are
known to be higher than their static counterparts. While this bound is exponentially far from the
aforementioned upper bounds, a recurring theme in complexity theory is that information-theoretic
lower bounds are significantly more challenging compared to black-box bounds, and hence lower. It
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is widely believed that the logarithmic lower bound is far from tight, especially in the fully dynamic
setting. Indeed, Panigrahy et al. [PTW10] conjecture that the dynamic cell-probe complexity of
ANN should be polynomial, but could only prove this for LSH-type data structures (a.k.a “low
contention”) where no single cell is probed too often. There are also conditional (“black-box”)
lower bounds asserting that polynomial Ω(nǫ) operational time is indeed necessary for the offline
version of ANN, under the Strong Exponential-Time Hypothesis ([ARW17, Wil18, Rub18]).
Privacy-Preserving Near-Neighbor Search. Due to the increasing size of today’s datasets,
an orthogonal line of research has been studied for privacy-preserving near-neighbor search. In this
scenario, the dataset of points have been outsourced by a client to a third-party server such as
a cloud storage provider. The client would like to be able to perform near(est)-neighbor search
queries over the outsourced set of data points. However, the storage of potentially sensitive data
onto an untrusted third-party brings many privacy concerns. This leads to the natural problem of
whether a client is able to outsource a data set of points to an untrusted server while maintaining
the ability to perform private near(est)-neighbor queries over the data set efficiently.
One aspect of privacy is protecting the content of the outsourced data set. This problem can
be addressed by encryption where the client holds the secret key. However, the use of encryption
does not protect information leaked by observing the patterns of access to server memory. Towards
that end, the client may wish to implement oblivious access where the patterns of access to server
memory is independent of both the content of the data set as well as the queries performed by
the client. In order to focus on the latter problem, we assume the server’s view only contains the
patterns of access to server memory. Informally, δ-statistical obliviousness implies that for any
two operation sequences of equal length O1 and O2, it must be that |VD(O1)−VD(O2)| ≤ δ where
VD(O) is the distribution of access patterns to server memory by the data structure D executing O.
This can later be combined with standard computational assumptions and cryptographic encryption
or information-theoretic encryption via one-time padding (if the client can either hold or securely
store a random pad) to ensure privacy of the data set contents.
To address the problem of protecting access patterns, the oblivious RAM (ORAM) primitive
was introduced by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [GO96]. ORAM considers the scenario where the server
holds an array and the client wishes to either retrieve or update various elements in the array while
guaranteeing oblivious access. ORAMs are very powerful as they provide a simple transformation
from any data structure into an oblivious data structure. By executing every access to server
memory of any non-oblivious data structure using an ORAM, the access pattern of the resulting
data structure ends up being oblivious. Due to the importance of ORAM, there has been a long line
of work constructing ORAMs. For example, we refer the reader to some examples: [PR10, DMN11,
GM11, GMOT12, KLO12, SVDS+13, CLP14, GHL+14, BCP16, CLT16, GLOS15]. Recently, this
wave of research led to the O(lg n·lg lg n) ORAM construction by Patel et al. [PPRY18], and, finally,
an O(lg n) ORAM by Asharov et al. [AKL+18]. Therefore, we can build an oblivious data structure
with an additional logarithmic overhead compared to the best non-oblivious data structure.
There has also been significant work on the lower bound of ORAMs. Goldreich and Ostro-
vksy [GO96] present an Ω(lg n) for ORAMs in the restricted setting of “balls-and-bins” model (i.e.
a “non-coding” assumption) and statistical security. Larsen and Nielsen [LN18] extended the Ω(lg n)
lower bound to the cell-probe model and computational security matching the aforementioned up-
per bounds. Additionally, works by Boyle and Naor [BN16] as well as Weiss and Wichs [WW18]
show that any non-trivial lower bounds for either offline or online, read-only ORAMs would imply
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huge breakthroughs in lower bounds for sorting circuits and/or locally decodable codes.
Going back to the problem of privacy-preserving near-neighbor search, many works in the past
decade [KS07, MCA07, GKK+08, WCKM09, PBP10, YLX13, ESJ14, LSP15, WHL16] attempt
to circumvent the additional efficiency overhead incurred by ORAM. Instead of ensuring oblivious
access where the access patterns are independent of the data set and queries, the access patterns
of many constructions from previous works end up leaking non-trivial amounts of information.
For example, the access patterns in the constructions by Wang et al. [WHL16] leak the identity
of the point reported by queries. In more detail, as their work considers the k-nearest-neighbor
problem, their algorithms leak the identity of the k encrypted points that are closest to the query
point. Recent work by Kornaropoulos et al. [KPT18] has shown that this non-trivial leakage
can be abused to accurately retrieve almost all private data. As a result, the requirement of
oblivious access is integral to ensure privacy for the near-neighbor problem. Therefore, several
works consider variants of near-neighbor search with oblivious access such as [EFG+09, SSW09,
BBC+10, EHKM11, SFR18, AHLR18, CCD+19] to name a few.
An intriguing question is whether the extra Θ(lg n) overhead for oblivious data structures over
their non-oblivious counterparts is really necessary. For the problem of RAMs, it has been shown
that the Θ(lg n) overhead is both necessary and sufficient [LN18, PY18]. Jacob et al. [JLN19] also
show that the Θ(lg n) overhead is necessary and sufficient for many fundamental data structures
such as stacks and queues, but quite surprisingly, Jafargholi et al. [JLS19] very recently showed that
(comparison-based) priority queues can be made oblivious with no overhead at all. We consider
this question for the ANN problem. In particular, is it possible to prove a logarithmically larger
lower bound for the oblivious ANN problem as opposed to the best known non-oblivious ANN lower
bound? We answer in the affirmative in this work.
1.1 Our Contributions
Our main result is a stronger cell-probe lower bound for the oblivious ANN problem, which is
Ω˜(lg n) higher than the best known cell-probe lower bound for the non-oblivious ANN problem.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). Let D be any dynamic, statistically oblivious data structure that solves
(c, r)-ANNd,ℓ1 over the d-dimensional Hamming cube, on an online sequence of n insertions and
queries, in the oblivious cell-probe model with word size w and client storage of m = o(n) bits. Then
for some constant c > 1 and r = Θ(d), D must have worst case per-operation running time
Ω
(
d · lg(n/m)
(lg(w lg n))2
)
.
In the natural setting ofm ≤ n1−ρ and w = Θ(lg n), the operational time is at least Ω(d lg n/(lg lg n)2).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that a lower bound of ω(d) has been
successfully proved for ANN in the cell-probe model. This is also the first oblivious cell-probe lower
bound exceeding ω(lg n). Previous works on oblivious cell-probe lower bounds have focused on
data structures with O(
√
lg n) or smaller complexity for their non-oblivious counterparts (such as
RAMs [LN18, PY18] as well as stacks, queues, deques, priority queues and search trees [JLN19])
and peaked at Ω(lg n). On the technical side, we remark that our work is the first to apply the
technique of Larsen [Lar12a] of combining the chronogram [FS89] with cell sampling [PTW10] to
prove a lower bound on privacy-preserving data structures. So far, these techniques could not be
leveraged to prove higher bounds in the oblivious cell-probe model.
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To complement our main result, we present a variant of the reduction by Bentley and Saxe [BS80],
who showed that dynamic data structures can be built in a black-box fashion from their static coun-
terparts, for the special class of decomposable problems (which include many natural variants of
near-neighbors search, range searching and any class of linear queries). We show that any oblivious
static data structure solving a decomposable problem can be transformed into an oblivious dynamic
data structure with only an additional logarithmic overhead.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). If there exists an oblivious static data structure for a decomposable
problem P of n items with storage of Sst(n) cells, preprocessing of P st(n) cell-probes and amor-
tized Qst(n) cell probes for queries, then there exists an oblivious dynamic data structure for P
using Sdy(n) = O(Sst(n)) cells of storage, preprocessing of P dy(n) = P st(n) cell probes, amortized
Qdy(n) = O(lg n ·Qst(n) + lg n · P st(n)/n) cell probes for each query/update operation.
The above theorem states that the largest separation between oblivious cell-probe lower bounds
for static and dynamic structures solving decomposable problems can be at most logarithmic. One
can view the chronogram technique as creating a dynamic data structure lower bound by boosting
a static data structure lower bound (via the cell sampling method) by an Ω˜(lg n) factor. Therefore,
the chronogram can be viewed as optimal for decomposable problems even in the oblivious model.
1.2 Technical Overview
The high-level approach behind the proof of Theorem 1.1 is to exploit obliviousness in a new
(and subtle) way in order to compose a variation of the static cell-sampling lower bound for ANN
in [PTW10] together with the chronogram method [FS89]. While this template was the technical
approach of several previous dynamic data structure lower bounds for queries with “error-correcting
codes” (ECC) properties (such as polynomial evaluation [Lar12a], range counting [Lar12b] and
online matrix-multiplication [CGL15]), this program is doomed to fail for ANN for two fundamental
reasons. The first reason is that the chronogram method requires the underlying data structure
problem to have an “ECC-like” property, namely, that any local modification of the database
changes the answer to (say) half of the queries (in other words, a random query is sensitive to
even a single update in the data set). In contrast, ANN queries are sensitive only to updates in an
exponentially-small volumed ball around the query point. This already impedes the application of
the chronogram method. The second, more subtle and technically challenging problem, is the fact
that in the ANN problem, only a tiny fraction (1/poly(n)) of queries actually reveal information
about the underlying data set – these are queries which reside close to the data set and hence
may report an input point (we call these “yes” queries). As explained below, this feature of
ANN turns out to be a significant barrier in carrying over the static cell-sampling argument to
the dynamic setting (as opposed to cell-sampling lower bounds for “k-wise independent” queries),
and overcoming this problem is the heart of the paper. Surpassing this obstacle also entailed us
to construct an alternative information-theoretic proof of [PTW10]’s static lower bound for the
standard (non-oblivious) ANN problem, which is key for scaling it to the dynamic setting (and, as
a bonus, also improves the parameters of the lower bound in [PTW10]).
In order to overcome the aforementioned two challenges, we use obliviousness in two different
ways. The first one, which is more standard (in light of recent works [LN18, PY18]), overcomes
the first problem, mentioned above, of insensitivity of near-neighbor queries to the chronogram
construction. Recall that the chronogram method partitions a sequence of Θ(n) random update
operations into Θ˜(lg n) geometrically decreasing intervals (“epochs”), where the hope is to show
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that a random query is simulteneously sensitive to (essentially) all epochs. As discussed above,
ANN lacks this property, and it is not hard to see that if, for example, updates are drawn uniformly
and independently at random, then any query will only be sensitive to the first O(1) epochs with
overwhelming probability (due to the geometric decay of epochs, which is essential, as it reduces a
dynamic lower bound to that of solving logarithmically many independent static problems, one per
epoch). We circumvent this issue by using a simple geometric partitioning trick of the hypercube
together with the (computational) indistinguishability constraint of ORAMs. This argument is
key to the proof, as it reverses the quantifiers: it implies that for oblivious data structures, it is
enough to show that for each epoch, there is some distribution on ANN queries that must read Ω˜(d)
cells from the epoch (as opposed to a single distribution which is sensitive to all epochs). Indeed,
assuming this (much) weaker condition, if the data structure does not probe Ω˜(d) cells from every
epoch, an adversary (even when computationally bounded) can learn information about the query’s
location (in particular, which partition the query belongs to), contradicting obliviousness.
The second way in which we exploit obliviousness is much more subtle and illuminates the
difficulty in carrying out cell-sampling static lower bounds in dynamic settings for data structure
problems (like ANN) where only o(1)-fraction of the queries reveal useful information. Before diving
into the dynamic case, we briefly explain our modifications of the static lower bound which enables a
higher lower bound in the dynamic setting. At a high level, the cell-sampling argument of [PTW10]
shows that for very efficient, static data structures, there exists a small number of memory cells T
of the data structure that are the only cells probed by many queries. These queries are referred
to as resolved queries and denoted by Q(T ). The main idea of cell sampling is to show that the
queries in Q(T ) reveal more bits of information about the underlying data set (denoted by X) than
the number of bits that can be stored in the sampled cells T , which would lead to a contradiction.
However, in the ANN setting, showing that the queries in Q(T ) reveal enough information about
the underlying data set X is highly nontrivial – One way to prove this statement is to show that
the resolved queries are essentially independent of the underlying data set, i.e., Q(T ) ⊥ X. If this
were true, then a standard metric expansion argument shows that the neighborhood of distance r
surrounding all resolved queries Q(T ), covers at least half of the boolean hypercube. As a result, all
points landing in the neighborhood of Q(T ) will be reported by at least one query in Q(T ). If the
points in the data set are generated uniformly and independently distributed conditioned on Q(T ),
it can be shown that a constant fraction of data set points in X will fall into neighborhood of Q(T )
except with negligible probability. Hence, a constant fraction of points in X will be recovered by
using only the contents of sampled cells T . Alas, for adaptive data structures, the resolved queries
could depend heavily on the content of the cells, and this correlates Q(T ) and the database X. In
the work of [PTW10], the authors handle this correlation using a careful, adaptive cell-sampling
argument combined with a union-bound over all possible memory states of the data structure, which
effectively breaks the dependence between resolved queries Q(T ) and the data set X. We present
an alternative method of proving independence using information theoretic arguments. Intuitively,
even though Q(T ) and X are indeed correlated random variables in the general adaptive setting,
we argue that this correlation cannot be too large: the set of resolved queries Q(T ) are completely
determined by the addresses and contents of the sampled cells T , as one can determine whether
q ∈ Q(T ) by executing q and checking if q ever probes a cell outside of T . Since T is a small set
of cells, the data set X and the set of resolved queries Q(T ) have low mutual information by a
data processing inequality. We formalize this intuition by constructing an impossible “geometric
packing” compression argument of the data set X using only the sampled cells T . These ideas also
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allow us to use one-round cell sampling [Lar12b] as opposed to multiple-round cell-sampling, which
slightly improves the lower bound shown in [PTW10].
Moving back to the dynamic setting, our new arguments still break down due to the fact that
memory cells may be overwritten at different points in time. The typical method for proving
dynamic lower bounds [Lar12a, Lar12b] composes the cell sampling technique and chronogram
method. A random update sequence U is partitioned into geometrically-decreasing sized epochs.
For epoch i, we denote Ci(U) as all cells that were last overwritten by updates in epoch i, Ui.
Next, the cell sampling technique is applied to each Ci(U) to find a small subset of sampled cells
Ti ⊆ Ci(U) such that for almost all queries, the only cells probed in Ci(U) appear in Ti. We
denote these resolved queries by Qi(Ti). Once again, we need to show that the answers of resolved
queries Qi(Ti) reveal a lot of information about points inserted in Ui. Unfortunately, our previous
approach fails as it is impossible to determine Qi(Ti) using only the sampled cells Ti. Note, if a
query probes a cell outside of Ti, one cannot determine whether the cell belongs to Ci(U) or not.
Therefore, one needs to know the addresses of cells in Ci(U), denoted by C
addr
i (U), to determine
Qi(Ti). Unfortunately, the number of bits needed to express C
addr
i (U) may be very large and contain
significant information about Ui. So, we can no longer argue that the set of resolved queries Qi(Ti)
is determined by a low-entropy random variable as in the static case.
This is where statistical obliviousness comes to the rescue. The main observation is that the
addresses of cells last overwritten by updates in epoch i, Caddri (U), cannot reveal too much in-
formation about the updates in Ui for any sufficiently statistically oblivious data structure. We
prove this using a certain “reverse Pinsker inequality” which allows us to conclude that the mutual
information I(Ui;C
addr
i (U)) = o(|Ui|) bits for any O(1/ lg2 n)-statistically oblivious data struc-
ture. We note this inequality may be of independent interest to other oblivious lower bounds.
Now, we can see that the address sequence Caddri (U), together with the small set of sampled cells
Ti ⊆ Ci(U) from the i-th epoch, completely determine the resolved query set Qi(Ti). Therefore,
a data processing argument once again asserts that the large resolved query set Qi(Ti) is almost
independent of the updates Ui. By a packing argument (similar to the static case), we can show
that a constant fraction of the points in Ui fall into the neighborhood around the resolved queries
Qi(Ti) and each of these points will be returned by at least one resolved query. As a result, the
answers of resolved queries reveal more information about Ui than the number of bits that can be
stored in the sampled cells Ti providing our desired contradiction. We conclude that at least Ω˜(d)
cells must be probed from each epoch. Combined with our first application of obliviousness, we
show that Ω˜(d lg n) cells must be probed from all epochs.
1.3 Related Work
The cell-probe model was introduced by Yao [Yao81] as the most abstract (and compelling) model
for proving lower bounds on the operational time of data structures, as it is agnostic to implemen-
tation or hardware details, and hence captures any imaginable data structure. The chronogram
technique of Fredman and Saks [FS89] was the first to prove Ω(lg n/ lg lg n) dynamic cell-probe
lower bounds. Paˇtras¸cu and Demaine [PD06] later introduced the information transfer technique
which was able to prove Ω(lg n) lower bounds. Larsen [Lar12a] was able to combine the chronogram
with the cell-sampling technique of static data structures [PTW10] to prove an Ω((lg n/ lg lg n)2)
for range searching problems, which remains the highest cell-probe lower bound to date for any
dynamic search problem. Recently, Larsen et al. [LWY18] exhibited a new technique for proving
Ω˜(lg1.5 n) cell-probe lower bounds on decision data structure problems, circumventing the need for
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large outputs (answer length) in previous lower bounds.
Oblivious cell-probe lower bounds. The seminal work of Larsen and Nielsen [LN18] presented
the first cell-probe lower bound for oblivious data structures, in which they proved a (tight) Ω(lg n)
lower bound for ORAMs. Jacob et al. [JLN19] show Ω(lg n) cell-probe lower bounds for oblivious
stacks, queues, deques, priority queues and search trees. Both [LN18, JLN19] adapt the information
transfer technique of Paˇtras¸cu and Demaine [PD06]. Persiano and Yeo [PY18] show an Ω(lg n) lower
bound for differentially private RAMs which have weaker security notions than ORAMs using the
chronogram technique originally introduced by Fredman and Saks [FS89] with modifications by
Paˇtras¸cu [Pat08]. Another line of work has investigated the hardness of lower bounds for other
variants of ORAMs. Boyle and Naor [BN16] show that lower bounds for offline ORAMs (where
all operations are given in batch before execution) imply lower bounds for sorting circuits. Weiss
and Wichs [WW18] show that lower bounds for online, read-only ORAMs imply lower bounds for
either sorting circuits and/or locally decodable codes.
Near-neighbor lower bounds. There have been many previous works on lower bounds for
non-oblivious near(est)-neighbors problems. The following series of lower bound results considered
deterministic algorithms in polynomial space [BOR99, BR02, CCGL03, Liu04]. Chakrabarti and
Regev [CR04] present tight lower bounds for the approximate-nearest-neighbor problem for possi-
bly randomized algorithms that use polynomial space. Several later works consider various lower
bounds for near(est)-neighbors with different space requirements, the ability to use randomness and
different metric spaces [CR04, PT06, AIP06, ACP08, PTW08]. As mentioned before, the highest
cell-probe lower bound for dynamic ANN is the static Ω(d/ lg(sw/dn)) lower bound of Wang and
Yin [WY14]. In fact, all the above works prove lower bounds on static near-neighbor search where
the data set is fixed and no points may be added.
2 Preliminaries
We present a formal definition of the oblivious cell-probe model as well as the ANN problem.
2.1 Oblivious Cell Probe Model
We will prove our lower bounds in the oblivious cell-probe model which was introduced by Larsen
and Nielsen [LN18] and is an extension of the original cell-probe introduced by Yao [Yao81]. The
oblivious cell-probe model consists of two parties: the client and the server. The client outsources
the storage of data to the adversarial server which is considered to be honest-but-curious (also
referred to as semi-honest). In addition, the client wishes to perform some set of operations over
the outsourced data in an oblivious manner. Oblivousness refers to the the client’s wishes to hide
the operations performed on the data from the adversarial server that views the sequence of cells
probed in the server’s memory. Note the adversary’s view does not contain the contents of server
memory as a way to separate the security of accessing data and securing the contents of data. We
now describe the oblivious cell-probe model in detail.
In the oblivious cell-probe model, the server’s memory consists of cells with w bits. Each cell is
given a unique address from the set of integers [K]. It is assumed that all cell addresses can fit into
a single word which means that w ≥ ⌈lg2K⌉. The client’s memory consists of m bits. Additionally,
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there exists an arbitrarily long, finite length binary string R which contains all the randomness
that will be used by the data structure. For cryptographic purposes, R may also be used as a
random oracle. The binary string R is chosen uniformly at random before the data structure starts
processing any operations. As a result, R is independent of any operations of the data structure.
A data structure in the oblivious cell-probe model performs operations that only involve either
a cell probe to server memory or accessing bits on client memory. During a cell probe in server
memory, the data structure is able to read or overwrite the contents of the probed cell. The cost
of any operation is measured by the number of cells that are probed on the server’s memory. The
accesses to bits in client memory are considered free for the data structure. Any access to bits in
the random string R are also free. We denote the expected query cost to be the maximum over
all sequences of operations O and query q of the expected number of cell probes performed when
answering query q over the random string R after processing the all operations in O. We denote the
worst case update cost as the maximum over all sequences of operations O, update u and random
string R of the number of cells probed when processing update u after processing all operations in
O.
We now move onto the privacy requirements of data structures in the oblivious cell-probe model.
The random variable VD(Q) as the adversary’s view of the data structure D processing a sequence
of operations where randomness is over the choice of the random string R. The adversary’s view,
VD(O), will contain the addresses of cells that are probed by D when processing O. Finally, we
assume that D must process a sequence of operations in an online manner. That is, D must
finish executing one operation before receiving the next operation. Furthermore, the adversary
is aware when execution of one operation finishes and the execution of another operation begins.
As a result, for any sequence O = (op1, . . . , opn), we can decompose the adversary’s view as
VD(O) = (VD(op1), . . . ,VD(opn)). Unlike the previous model, we will assume statistical security
instead of computational security. We now present a formal definition of the security of an oblivious
cell-probe data structure.
Definition 2.1. A cell-probe data structure D is δ-statistically oblivious if for any two equal length
sequences O1 and O2 consisting of valid operations, then the statistical distances of VD(O1) and
VD(O2) satisfy
|VD(O1)− VD(O2)| ≤ δ.
Throughout the rest of our work, we will consider δ-statistical obliviousness with δ ≤ 1/ lg2 n.
Note that the above definition is a much weaker definition than previous definitions of statistical
obliviousness in cryptography as the distinguishing probability need be at most 1/ lg2 n as opposed
to being a negligible function of n. However, as we are proving a lower bound, a weaker notion of
obliviousness results in strong lower bounds.
We now briefly describe the implications of cell-probe lower bounds in the client-server setting.
The majority of previous ORAM works considered the server to be passive storage, which means
that the server does not perform any computation beyond retrieving and overwriting the contents
of cell at the request of the client. In this case, a cell-probe lower bound implies a bandwidth
lower bound in the client-server setting for any oblivious data structure. On the other hand, if we
consider the case when the server can perform arbitrary computation, any cell-probe lower bound
implies a lower bound on server computation.
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2.2 Approximate-Near-Neighbor (ANN) Problem
We now formally define the (c, r)-approximate-near-neighbor problem over the d-dimensional boolean
hypercube using the ℓ1 distance as the measure. In our work, we focus on the online version which
allows insertion of points into the dataset. Let U := {0, 1}d denote the set of all points in the space.
If the insert operation is called with the same point p ∈ U twice, then the second insert operation
is ignored. We now formally describe the problem.
Definition 2.2 (Online, Dynamic (c, r)-ANNd,ℓ1). The dynamic (c, r)-approximate-near-neighbor
problem over the d-dimensional boolean hypercube endowed with the ℓ1 distance measure asks to
design a data structure that maintains an online dataset S ⊂ U under an online sequence of n
operations of the following two types:
1. insert(p), p ∈ U : Insert the point p if it does not already exist in S;
2. query(q), q ∈ U : If there exists a unique p ∈ S such that ℓ1(p, q) ≤ r, then report any any
p′ ∈ S such that ℓ1(p′, q) ≤ cr. If all points p ∈ S are such that ℓ1(p, q) > r, then the output
should be ⊥.
2.3 Decomposable Problems
We now define decomposable problems. From a high level, a problem is decomposable if the
problem may be solved on partitions of any data set and the results can be combined to give the
result over the entire data set. Many natural problems are decomposable such as many variants of
near-neighbors search, range counting and interval stabbing.
Definition 2.3. A problem P is decomposable if for any two disjoint data sets D1 and D2 and
any query q, there exists a function f that can be computed in O(1) time such that
P(q,D1 ∪D2) = f(P(q,D1),P(q,D2)).
3 Oblivious, Dynamic Lower Bound
In this section, we prove a logarithmically larger lower bound for the dynamic variant of the
ANN problem compared to the previous, highest lower bound for non-oblivious ANN by Wang and
Yin [WY14]. We consider the (c, r)-ANNd,ℓ1 problem over a d-dimensional boolean hypercube with
respect to the ℓ1 norm where d = Ω(lg n) and Θ(n) will be number of points inserted into the data
set. We denote tu as the worst case time for any insert operation and tq as the expected time for
any query operation. For our oblivious lower bound, we consider the two party scenario where a
client stores m bits that are free to access while the server holds the cells consisting of the data
structure’s storage. We prove the following lower bound:
Theorem 3.1. Let D be an randomized, dynamic, oblivious cell-probe data structure for (c, r)-
ANNd,ℓ1 over a d-dimensional boolean hypercube where d = Ω(lg n) under the ℓ1 norm. Let w
denote the cell size in bits, S denote the number of cells stored by the server for the data structure
and m denote the client storage in bits. If m = o(n), then there exists parameters of constant c ≥ 1
and r = Θ(d) and a sequence of Θ(n) operations such that
tq = Ω
(
d · lg(n/m)
(lg(tuw))2
)
.
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To prove Theorem 3.1, we proceed with a “geometric variation” of the chronogram argument
in [Lar12a] where our operation sequence consists of Θ(n) independent but not identically drawn
random insert operations, which we will describe later. This random sequence of updates is fol-
lowed by a single query operation. The insert operations are partitioned into epochs whose sizes
decrease exponentially by a parameter β ≥ 2 which will be defined later. All epochs will contain
at least max{√n,m2} insert operations. Each epoch will be indexed by an non-negative integer
that increases in reverse chronological time. Epoch 0 will consist of the last max{√n,m2} insert
operations before the query is performed, epoch 1 will consist of the last β · max{√n,m2} insert
operations before epoch 1 and so forth. Therefore, there will be k := Θ(lgβ(n/m)) epochs. For all
epochs i where 0 ≤ i < k will consist of exactly ni := βi ·max{
√
n,m2} insert operations.
For notation, the sequence of n insert operations are denoted by the random variable U. We
denote the sequence of insert operations in any epoch indexed by i using the random variable Ui.
Therefore, we can write U = (Uk−1, . . . ,U0).
Hard distribution. Given the partitioning of the Θ(n) insert operations into geometrically de-
caying epochs, we now define the hard distribution for our lower bound. In order to (later) exploit
the obliviousness of the data structure, our hard distribution shall have a “direct sum” structure,
which is simple to design using the geometry of the ANN problem. Conceptually, the hard distri-
bution will split the d-dimensional boolean hypercube into disjoint subcubes where each subcube
is uniquely assigned to one of the epochs. To this end, every epoch i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} will be
assigned a d′-dimensional boolean subcube where d′ := Θ(d) will be determined later. Each of the
insert operations of any epoch i will be generated independently by picking a point from epoch i’s
d′-dimensional boolean hypercube uniformly at random.
We now show how we split up the original d-dimensional boolean hypercube into k d′-dimensional
boolean subcubes that are disjoint. We choose the parameter d > d′ where d′ will be specified later.
We assign each of the k epochs a unique prefix of d − d′ bits denoted by p0, . . . , pk−1 ∈ {0, 1}d−d′
where pi is the prefix for epoch i. We will pick the prefixes in such a way that for any i 6= j ∈ [k],
ℓ1(pi, pj) > d
′. To see that such a choice of prefixes exist, we consider the following probabilistic
method where we pick the k prefixes of d − d′ bits uniformly at random. For any two i 6= j ∈ [k]
and sufficiently large d = Ω(lg n), we know that
Pr[ℓ1(pi, pj) < 0.49(d − d′)] ≤ 1/n3.
By a Union bound over all n2 possible pairs, we get that there must exist some choice of k prefixes
such that pairwise prefixes have ℓ1 distance at least d
′ as long as d ≥ 4d′. The d′-dimensional
subcube for epoch i is constructed as all points in the original d-dimensional subcube restricted to
the case that the d− d′ coordinates match the prefix pi. We note that our choice of subcubes has
the important property that two points from different subcubes will be distance at least d′ from
each other as their prefixes already have ℓ1 distance of at least d
′.
Before continuing, we describe why this choice of hard distribution is compatible with oblivious
data structures. Intuitively, our choice of hard distribution is very revealing for the choice of update
points. An adversary is aware that updates from epoch i will be completely contained in the subcube
assigned to epoch i. Furthermore, as all subcubes are pairwise disjoint, two update points from
different epochs cannot be from the same subcube. We will exploit this fact in combination with
the oblivious guarantees to prove lower bounds on the operational cost of the final query. If, on
average, a query point does not probe many cells that were last overwritten in some epoch i, then the
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adversary can simply rule out that the query point was chosen from the disjoint subcube assigned
to epoch i. This knowledge learned by the adversary can be used to contradict the obliviousness
property. As a result, we can show that an oblivious data structure must query many cells last
written from all epochs to hide the identity of the query point even if the query needs no information
from some epochs.
Formally, we define the distribution of updates in epoch i ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}, Ui, as the product of
ni identical distributions, µi. The distribution µi deterministically appends the prefix pi uniquely
assigned to epoch i and picks the remaining d′ coordinates uniformly at random. We denote this
d′-dimensional subcube using Pi. The entire distribution of updates over all epochs, U, can be
viewed as the product of distribution U = Uk−1 × . . . ×U0. Our hard query distribution q will
simply be to query any fixed point that lies outside each of the subcubes P0, . . . , Pk−1.
We show that the probability that any two points inserted during Ui are too close is low.
Lemma 3.2. LetUi be the set of update points inserted in epoch i according to the hard distribution.
For sufficiently large d′ = Ω(lg n), there cannot exist any query q such that ℓ1(u, q) ≤ 0.24d′ and
ℓ1(v, q) ≤ 0.24d′ for any two different points u and v chosen by Ui except with probability at most
1/n.
Proof. Note both u and v are chosen uniformly at random from a d′-dimensional boolean hypercube.
As a result, we know that E[ℓ1(u, v)] = 0.5d
′. We apply Chernoff Bounds over the coordinates of
u and v to get that Pr[ℓ1(u, v) ≥ 0.49d′] ≤ 1/n3 for sufficiently large d′ = Θ(d) = Ω(lg n). Next,
we apply a Union Bound over all
(
n
2
) ≤ n2 pairs of points in X. As a result, the probability of the
existence of two points u and v whose distance is at most 0.49d′ is at most 1/n.
Suppose there exists a query q such that ℓ1(u, q) ≤ 0.24d′ and ℓ1(v, q) ≤ 0.24d′. By the triangle
inequality, we know that ℓ1(u, v) ≤ 0.48d′ < 0.49d′. This only occurs with probability at most
1/n.
Additionally, we also want that queries cover large portions of the boolean hypercube cube such
that they must report a point if it lands in these large subspaces of the boolean hypercube. We
quantify this by considering the neighborhood of subsets of queries over the boolean hypercube.
For any query q, we consider its neighborhood to be all points in the boolean hypercube that are
distance at most r from q. For subsets of queries within an epoch’s assigned subcube denoted by
Q ⊆ {0, 1}d′ , we consider the neighborhood of Q to be any points within distance r of any query
q ∈ Q. We denote the neighborhood of Q by Γr(Q). We will use the following standard isoperimetric
inequality describing the size of neighborhoods over any d′-dimensional boolean hypercube which
follows directly from Harper’s theorem [FF81].
Lemma 3.3. Let H be all the vertices of a d-dimensional boolean hypercube. Let V be a subset
of vertices in H such that |V | ≤ 1/(2aǫ2d) · |H| and let Γǫd(V ) be the set of all vertices that are
distance at most ǫd from any of the vertices in V . Then, there exists some constant a > 1 such that
|Γǫd(V )| ≥ aǫ2d · |V |.
For convenience, we denote Φ := Φ(r) := aǫ
2d′ as the expansion over each of the d′-dimensional
boolean hypercubes for distances of r := ǫ · d′ where 0 < ǫ < 1 is a constant. The above lemmata
will end up being important later when we prove our lower bounds.
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Choosing parameters. We now choose the parameters for our problem. First, we want to ensure
that if a query q may report any point, that point will be unique with high probability. We can
ensure this property by picking cr ≤ 0.24d′ and applying Lemma 3.2. To ensure large expansion
within each epoch’s subcube, we will set r = Θ(d′). As an example, we can choose parameters such
as r = 0.01d′ and 1 ≤ c ≤ 24 to get our desired properties.
3.1 Overview of Our Proof
Before we begin formally proving our lower bound, we present a high level overview showing the
steps of our approach. Our techniques will follow the techniques first outlined by Larsen [Lar12a],
which combine the chronogram introduced by Fredman and Saks [FS89] and the cell sampling
method introduced by Panigrahy et al. [PTW10]. We fix tu to be the worst case update time and
our goal is to prove a lower bound on the expected query time tq.
For the sequence of Θ(n) randomly chosen insert operations U, we denote C(U) as the random
variable of the set of all the cells stored by the data structure after processing all insert operations
of U. We partition the cells of C(U) into k groups depending on the most recent operation that
updated the contents of the cell. In particular, we denote Ci(U) as the random variable describing
the set of cells in C(U) whose contents were last updated by an insert operation performed during
epoch i. For any query point q ∈ Q, we denote ti(U, q) as the random variable denoting the number
of cells that are probed by the query algorithm on input q that belong to the set Ci(U). For any
set of queries Q′ ⊆ Q, we denote the random variable ti(U,q) as the total number of cells probed
from Ci(U) when processing a query operation where the input q is chosen uniformly at random
from Q′.
The first step of our proof will be to focus on individual epochs.
Lemma 3.4. Fix the random string R. If β = (wtu)
2, then for all epochs i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1},
Pr
[
ti(U,qi) = Ω
(
d′
lg(tuw)
)]
≥ 1/2
where qi is chosen uniformly at random from Pi.
The proof of this lemma will use the cell sampling technique introduced by Panigrahy et
al. [PTW10] for static (non-oblivious) ANN lower bounds. Their main idea is to, first, assume
the existence of an extremely efficient static data structure that probes a small number of cells in
expectation. Next, they the show the existence of a small subset of cells that resolve a very large
subset of possible queries where a query is resolved by a subset of cells if the query does not probe
any cells outside of the subset. Afterwards, they show that the answers of the resolved queries
reveal more bits of information about the input than the maximal amount of information that can
be stored about input in the subset of sampled cells. This results in a contradiction showing there
cannot exist such an efficient static data structure that was original assumed.
However, to show that a lot of information is revealed by resolved queries, the work of [PTW10]
used several complex combinatorial techniques. These complex techniques end up being hard to
scale for the dynamic setting. To prove our dynamic lower bound, we first present new ideas that
simplify the static (non-oblivious) ANN proof using information theoretic arguments. At a high
level, we show that the set of resolved queries are a deterministic function of the sampled cells which
contain very little information about the inputs. This suffices to prove that the resolved query set
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and inputs are almost independent. Since the input points are chosen uniformly at random, it turns
out that resolved queries will return a large number of input points with constant probability, which
would allow us to forego the complex techniques that appear in [PTW10].
Unfortunately, it turns out significantly larger problems appear when moving to the dynamic
setting even when using our simplifications. Towards a contradiction, assume that there exists an
efficient data structure that probes o(d′/ lg(tuw)) cells from the set Ci(U) in expectation. We can
apply the cell sampling technique to find a small subset Ti ⊂ Ci(U) that resolves a large number
of queries. In this case, a query q is resolved by Ti if all cells that are probed by q in the set Ci(U)
all belong to Ti. Note, we do not project any restrictions on the cells probed by q outside the set
Ci(U). Once again, denote the set of queries resolved by Ti using Qi(Ti). Using our information
theoretic ideas, we want to show that Qi(Ti) can be computed using only the little information
stored in the set of sampled cells Ti and the client storage M(U) as well as the random string R.
In the dynamic case, the set of queries Qi(Ti) cannot be computed using only Ti, M(U) and R. As
an example, consider a query q ∈ Pi. During the execution of q, consider the first time a probe is
performed outside the set Ti. There is no way to determine whether the probed cell exists in Ci(U)
or not using only the information in Ti, M(U) and R. As a result, it is impossible to accurately
compute the set of resolved queries Qi(Ti).
To get around this, we can attempt to also use Ci(U) to compute Qi(Ti). However, the set
Ci(U) is very large and may potentially contain significantly more information about Ui compared
to the set of sampled cells Ti and client storage M(U). As a result, we would not be able to
prove our contradiction. Instead, it turns out that computing Qi(Ti) only requires knowledge of
the addresses of Ci(U). By the guarantees of statistical obliviousness, we know that the addresses
of Ci(U) may not reveal too much information about the underlying update operations U. As a
result, we can show that even though Ci(U) is expressed using many bits, that most of the bits
cannot contain information about Ui.
One more issue that arises is that the above lemma is similar yet crucially different than those
used in lower bounds for non-oblivious data structures. In the standard application of the chrono-
gram technique, the analogue of this lemma typically asserts that a single random query qi must
be simultaneously “sensitive” to most epochs. That is, qi forces a large number of probes from
cells in Ci(U) for many (essentially all) epochs i simultaneously. Instead, our lemma says that
for the all epochs, there exists a special query distribution qi drawn uniformly at random from Pi
built specially for that epoch i that forces many probes to cells in Ci(U). It turns out that this
weaker lemma suffices for oblivious data structures. We are able to use the fact that obliviousness
must hide the input query point from any adversary. The main idea is that the adversary knows
there exists some query point from the set Pi that must probe Ω(d
′/ lg(tuw)) cells from Ci(U) to
correctly answer the query. If the adversary views a query that probes significantly less cells from
Ci(U), it can effectively deduce that the query does not come from the query set Pi for otherwise
the answer of the query could not be correct. This observation by the adversary would contradict
obliviousness. As a result, we can essentially boost Lemma 3.4 into the stronger variant below.
Lemma 3.5. If β = (wtu)
2, there exists a fixed query q such that
E[ti(U, q)] = Ω
(
d′
lg(tuw)
)
for all epochs i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}.
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The above lemma resembles the form of lemmata typically used in non-oblivious data struc-
ture lower bounds. We now show Lemma 3.5 suffices to complete the lower bound by proving
Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Note that sets of cells C0(U), . . . , Ck−1(U) are all disjoint and the random
variable ti(U, q) only counts the number of cells that are probed from Ci(U). Therefore, the total
number of cells probed by t(U, q) = t0(U, q)+ . . .+ tk−1(U, q). There are k = Θ(lgβ(n/m)) epochs.
Using linearity of expectation and Lemma 3.5, it can be shown that
E[t(U, q)] = Ω(d′ lg(n/m)/(lg(tuw))
2).
The proof is completed by noting that d = Θ(d′).
3.2 Bounding Cell Probes to Individual Epochs
Towards a contradiction, assume an extremely efficient data structure with ti(U,qi) = o(d
′/ lg(tuw))
where qi is drawn uniformly at random from Pi. We apply the cell sampling technique such that
a small subset of cells Ti ⊂ Ci(U) resolves a large number of queries Q(Ti) ⊆ Pi.
3.2.1 Cell Sampling
Lemma 3.6. Fix the random string R. Suppose that ti(U,qi) = o(lg Φ/ lg(tuw)) = o(d
′/ lg(tuw))
where qi is drawn uniformly at random from Pi. Then, there exists a subset of cells Ti ⊆ Ci(U)
with the following properties:
• |Ti| = ni100w ;
• Let Qi(Ti) be all queries resolved by Ti and probe at most 2ti(U,qi) cells in Ci(U). Recall a
query q ∈ Qi(Ti) is resolved by Ti if every cell in Ci(U) that is probed when executing q must
exist in the subset Ti. Then, |Qi(Ti)| ≥ 2d′−1/Φ.
Proof. For convenience, denote ti = ti(U,qi) = o(lg Φ/ lg(tuw)) = o(d
′/ lg(tuw)). Since we fixed
the random string R, the randomness of the data structure is strictly over the choice of updates
from the hard distribution U and the random query qi. By Markov’s inequality, there exists a
subset of queries Qi ⊂ Pi such that each q ∈ Qi probes at most 2ti cells in Ci(U) and Qi contains
at least |Pi|/2 = 2d′−1 queries.
Consider the following random experiment where a subset Ti ⊆ Ci(U) is chosen uniformly at
random from all subsets with exactly n/(100w) cells. Pick any query q ∈ Qi probing at most 2ti
cells in Ci(U). We will analyze the probability that q is resolved by Ti over the random choice of
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Ti.
( |Ci(U)|−2ti
ni/(100w)−2ti
)
( |Ci(U)|
ni/(100w)
) ≥ ni/(100w) · (ni/(100w) − 1) · · · (ni/(100w) − 2ti + 1)|Ci(U)| · (|Ci(U)| − 1) · · · (|Ci(U)| − 2ti + 1)
≥
(
ni/(100w) − 2ti
|Ci(U)|
)2ti
≥
(
ni
200|Ci(U)|w
)2ti
≥
(
1
200tuw
)2ti
≥ Φ−1.
The second last inequality uses the fact that |Ci(U)| ≤ nitu while the last inequality uses the fact
that ti = o(lg Φ/ lg(tuw)). By linearity of expectation, we know that
E[|Qi(Ti)|] ≥ |Qi| · Φ−1 = 2d′−1/Φ.
As a result, there exists a subset Ti ⊂ Ci(U) satisfying all the required properties.
3.2.2 Information from Resolved Queries
Next, we will show that the resolved queries Qi(Ti) will report a large number of points that are
inserted by Ui. Recall that a point in Ui is reported by a query in Qi(Ti) if and only if it belongs to
the neighborhood of Qi(Ti) denoted by Γr(Qi(Ti)) ⊆ Pi. Note, we only consider expansion within
the subcube Pi. For convenience, we fix U−i, which consists of all updates outside of epoch i.
Towards a contradiction, we will suppose that most points inserted by Ui land outside of
Γr(Qi(Ti)) and present an impossible compression ofUi. Formally, we construct a one-way encoding
protocol from an encoder (Alice) to a decoder (Bob). Alice receives as input U and the random
string R. Bob will receive the addresses of cells in Ci(U) denoted by C
addr
i (U) and the random
string R. The goal of Alice is to encode the ni points inserted in Ui. By Shannon’s source
coding theorem, the expected length of Alice’s encoding must be at least H(Ui | Caddri (U),R),
which we now analyze. In particular, we present an argument that the entropy of Ui remains
high even conditioned on Caddri (U) due to statistical obliviousness guarantees. However, statistical
obliviousness provides guarantees using statistical distance which is not directly compatible with
our information theoretic arguments. To do this, we present the following lemma upper bounds the
contributions of the positive terms to the Kullback-Leibler divergence between two distributions,
in terms of their statistical distance. We note a similar lemma previously appeared in [BRWY13].
Lemma 3.7 (Reverse Pinsker). Let p(a, b) and q(a, b) be two distributions over A×B in the same
probability space, and let S =
{
(a, b) : lg p(a|b)q(a|b) > 1
}
. Then, p(S) < 2|p(a, b) − q(a, b)|.
Proof. Let ǫ = |p(a, b) − q(a, b)| := 2maxT {p(T ) − q(T )} ≥ 2(p(S) − q(S)). Rearranging sides, we
have:
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p(S) ≤ ǫ/2 + q(S)
< ǫ/2 + (1/2)
∑
(a,b)∈S
q(b) · p(a|b)
≤ ǫ/2 + (1/2)
∑
(a,b)∈S
p(b) · p(a|b) + (1/2)
∑
(a,b)∈S
|q(b)− p(b)| · p(a|b)
≤ ǫ/2 + p(S)/2 + (1/2)
∑
(a,b)∈S
|q(b)− p(b)| · p(a|b)
≤ ǫ/2 + p(S)/2 + (1/2)
∑
b
|q(b)− p(b)|
≤ ǫ+ p(S)/2
where the second inequality follows from the fact for any (a, b) ∈ S, q(a|b) ≥ p(a|b)/2 by the choice
of S.
This lemma directly implies that DKL(p(a, b)||q(a, b)) ≤ 2|p−q|1 ·maxa,b lg(p(a|b)/(q(a|b)))+1,
since the total contribution of terms outside S is at most
∑
(a,b) p(a|b) ≤ 1. Using the above, we
show that the entropy of Ui conditioned on Bob’s input remains large.
Lemma 3.8. Consider any U where all of U1, . . . ,Ui−1,Ui+1, . . . ,Uk−1 are fixed. That is, all
update operations outside of epoch i are fixed, and denote this fixed value by U−i = u−i. Then,
H(Ui | Caddri (U),R, u−i) = ni ·
(
d′ − o(1)) .
Proof. We analyze the mutual information between Ui and VD(U). Denote by P and Q the
following distributions: P ∼ (Ui | VD(U), u−i) and Q ∼ (Ui | u−i). By definition,
I(P ;Q) = Ev∼VD(U) [DKL(P (Ui | v, u−i) ‖ Q(Ui | u−i))]
≤ 2 · Ev [‖P −Q‖1] · max
ui,u−i,v
lg
(
P (ui | u−i, v)
Q(ui)
)
+ 1
= O
(
ni · d′
lg2 n
)
where the first inequality is by Lemma 3.7, and the second is by the statistical-indistinguishability
premise that ‖P − Q‖1 ≤ 1/ lg2 n, and the fact that Ui picks points uniformly at random and
independent of U−i. Hence the ratio between P and Q never exceeds 2
nid.
Now, recall thatR is independent ofUi and thatUi is generated independent ofU−i. Therefore,
H(Ui | Caddri (U),R, u−i) = H(Ui | Caddri (U)).
We can rewrite
H(Ui | Caddri (U)) = H(Ui)− I(Ui;Caddri (U)) ≥ (ni · d′)
(
1−O
(
1
lg2 n
))
≥ ni · (d′ − o(1)).
The second inequality uses the fact that Caddri (U) appears in VD(U). So, I(P ;Q) = I(Ui;VD(U)) ≥
I(Ui;C
addr
i (U)). The last inequality uses the fact that d
′ = Ω(lg n).
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Going back to the original encoding protocol, we know that Alice’s expected encoding size must
be at least H(Ui | Caddri (U),R) = ni · (d′− o(1)). We will utilize the fact that most points inserted
by Ui land outside of Γr(Qi(Ti)) to present an impossible encoding scheme.
Lemma 3.9. Fix U−i, that is all update operations outside of epoch i. With probability at least
1/2 over the choice of Ui, at least ni/8 points in Ui exist in the neighborhood of the set of resolved
queries, Γr(Qi(Ti)). That is,
Pr[|Γr(Qi(Ti)) ∩Ui| ≥ ni/8] ≥ 1/2.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose that the number of points in Ui that land in Γr(Qi(Ti))
is at least ni/8 with probability at most 1/2. Let u−i be the realization of U−i. We construct
an impossible one-way communication protocol for encoding Ui which will contradict Shannon’s
source coding theorem.
Alice’s Encoding. Alice receives as input Ui, u−i and R.
1. Using u−i, Ui and R, execute all operations to compute the cell sets Ck−1(U), . . . , C0(U).
Afterwards, Alice finds the supposed Ti of Lemma 3.6. To do this, Alice can iterate through
all subsets of Ci(U) containing exactly ni/(100w) cells. Alice can also compute query sets
Qi(Ti) and Γr(Qi(Ti)). Finally, Alice computes F denoting the number of points of Ui in
Γr(Qi(Ti)).
2. If there are more than ni/8 points of Ui in Γr(Qi(Ti)), F ≥ ni/8, then Alice’s encoding starts
with a 0-bit. Alice encodes Ui in the trivial manner using ni · d′ bits.
3. Otherwise, suppose that less than ni/8 points of Ui land in Γr(Qi(Ti)). That is, F < ni/8.
In this case, Alice encodes the contents and addresses of Ti using 2w · |Ti| = n/50 bits.
Next, Alice encodes the set of cells last updated by operations after epoch i. That is, the
addresses and contents of cells in Ci−1(U), . . . , C0(U). The total number of cells in these are
ni/β + ni/β
2 + . . . = Θ(ni/β) as β ≥ 2. Alice also encodes the client storage after executing
all updates, M(u−i,Ui) using m = o(n) bits. Alice encodes F using lg ni bits and the indices
of Ui whose points land in Γr(Qi(Ti)) using lg
(ni
F
)
bits. Each of these F points are encoded
trivially using d′ bits each. The remaining ni − F points that land outside of Γr(Qi(Ti)) are
encoded using lg(|Pi| − |Γr(Qi(Ti))|) bits.
Bob’s Decoding. Bob receives as input u−i, C
addr
i (U), R and Alice’s encoding.
1. If Alice’s encoding starts with a 0-bit, then Bob decodes Ui using the next ni · d′ bits in the
trivial manner.
2. Otherwise, Bob executes all updates prior to epoch i using u−i and R. Bob decodes the ad-
dresses and contents of Ti ⊂ Ci(U) as well as the addresses and contents of Ci−1(U), . . . , C0(U).
At this point, Bob has the contents and addresses of all cell sets Ck−1(U), . . . , Ci+1(U),
Ci−1(U), . . . , C0(U). Additionally, Bob has the addresses of Ci(U), C
addr
i (U), but not the
contents. Using the next m bits, Bob decodes the client storage M(U) after executing all
updates. Bob attempts to execute each possible query in Pi to compute Qi(Ti). Note, Bob
executes each query using R and M(Ui) until the query attempts to probe a cell with an
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address in Caddri (U) \ T addri , probes more than 2tq cells or finishes executing. As long as a
query does not probe a cell in Ci(U) \ Ti, Bob is able to accurately simulate the query. As a
result, Bob accurately computes Qi(Ti) as well as Γr(Qi(Ti)). Next, Bob decodes F as well
as the F indices of Ui of points that in Γr(Qi(Ti)). For each of these F points, Bob uses
the next d′ bits to decode them in the trivial manner. For the remaining ni − F points, Bob
decodes the point using the next lg(|Pi| − |Γr(Qi(Ti))|).
Analysis. We start with the case of Alice’s encoding is prepended with a 0-bit. For this scenario,
Alice’s encoding is always 1 + ni · d′ bits. Alice’s encoding starts with a 0-bit only in the case that
there are more than ni/8 points of Ui that land in Γr(Qi(Ti)) which happens with probability at
most 1/2 by our assumption towards a contradiction.
When Alice’s encoding starts with a 1-bit, Alice’s encoding size in bits is at most
1+2w(|Ti|+ |Ci−1(U)|+ . . .+ |C0(U)|)+m+lg ni+lg
(
ni
F
)
+Fd′+(ni−F ) lg(|Pi|− |Γr(Qi(Ti))|.
By our choice of β = (tuw)
2, we know that |Ci−1(U)|+ . . .+ |C0(U)| = Θ(ni/β). By Lemma 3.3, we
know that |Γr(Qi(Ti))| ≥ |Qi(Ti)| ·Φ ≥ 2d′−1 as long as |Qi(Ti)|/Φ ≤ 2d′−1. If |Qi(Ti)| is too large,
we can pick any arbitrary subset of size 2d
′−1/Φ and consider the neighborhood of the subset. As a
result, we know that lg(|Pi| − |Γr(Qi(Ti))|) ≤ lg(2d′ − 2d′−1) = d′ − 1. Also, we note that ni ≥ m2,
so m = o(ni). Note that the encoding is maximized when F = ni/8:
nid
′ − 7ni
8
+
ni
50
+ o(ni) < nid
′ − ni
2
+ o(ni).
Denote p ≤ 1/2 to be the probability that Alice’s encoding starts with a 0-bit. Putting together
the two cases, we get:
p(1+nid
′)+(1−p)
(
nid
′ − ni
2
+ o(ni)
)
< nid
′−ni
4
+o(n) < ni(d
′−o(1)) = H(Ui | Caddri (U),R, u−i)
since the encoding is maximized when p = 1/2. As a result, our encoding is impossible as it
contradicts Shannon’s source coding theorem.
3.2.3 Proof of Lemma 3.4
Lemma 3.9 shows that at least ni/8 points of Ui will land in the set Γr(Qi(Ti)) with high constant
probability. By Lemma 3.2, all of these ni/8 points will be reported by at least one query Qi(Ti)
with high probability. We now show that the entropy contained in these ni/8 points is larger than
the number of bits that may be stored in the contents of the cells in Ti to prove Lemma 3.4.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Towards a contradiction, suppose that ti(U,qi) = o(d
′/ lg(tuw)). Our as-
sumption directly implies that Pr[ti(U,qi) = Ω(d
′/ lg(tuw))] < 1/2. For convenience, fix all up-
dates outside of epoch i as U−i = u−i. We present an impossible one-way communication protocol
between an encoder (Alice) and a decoder (Bob). Alice will attempt to encode Ui efficiently. Both
Alice and Bob will receive R. In addition, Bob will receive the addresses of cells in Ci(U) de-
noted by Caddri (U). Alice’s expected encoding size must at least H(Ui | Caddri (U),R, u−i). By
Lemma 3.8, we know that H(Ui | Caddri (U),R, u−i) = ni · (d′ − o(1)).
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Alice’s Encoding. As input, Alice receives Ui, u−i and R.
1. Using u−i, Ui and R, execute all operations to compute the cell sets Ck−1(U), . . . , C0(U).
Afterwards, Alice finds the supposed Ti of Lemma 3.6. To do this, Alice can iterate through
all subsets of Ci(U) containing exactly ni/(100w) cells. Alice can also compute query sets
Qi(Ti) and Γr(Qi(Ti)). Finally, Alice computes F denoting the number of points of Ui in
Γr(Qi(Ti)).
2. If there are less than ni/8 points in Γr(Qi(Ti)) corresponding to F < ni/8 or there exists two
points in Ui within distance at most 0.49d
′, Alice’s encoding will start with a 0-bit. Alice
will encode Ui in the trivial manner using ni · d′ bits.
3. Otherwise, Alice’s encoding starts with a 1-bit. Alice encodes the addresses and contents of
Ti using 2w · |Ti| = n/50 bits. Next, Alice encodes the addresses and contents of all cells
overwritten by an update operation after epoch i. That is, the cells in Ci−1(U), . . . , C0(U).
Alice also encodes the client storage after executing all update operations, M(U), using m
bits. Using ni bits, Alice encodes whether each of the points in Ui belong to Γr(Qi(Ti)) or
not. For all n− F points outside of Γr(Qi(Ti)), Alice encodes them using d′ bits each in the
trivial manner. Afterwards, Alice executes the queries in Qi(Ti) in some fixed order (such as
lexicographically increasing order). Each time a new point in Ui is reported, Alice encodes
the index of the point in Ui using lg ni bits completing the encoding.
Bob’s Decoding. Bob receives as input u−i, R and Alice’s encoding.
1. If Alice’s message starts with a 0-bit, then Bob decodes Ui in the trivial manner using the
next nid
′ bits.
2. If Alice’s encoding starts with a 1-bit, Bob executes all updates prior to epoch i using u−i
and R. Bob decodes the addresses and contents of Ti ⊂ Ci(U) as well as the addresses
and contents of Ci−1(U), . . . , C0(U). At this point, Bob has the contents and addresses of
all cell sets Ck−1(U), . . . , Ci+1(U), Ci−1(U), . . . , C0(U). Additionally, Bob has the addresses
of Ci(U), C
addr
i (U), but not the contents. Using the next m bits, Bob decodes the client
storage M(u−i,Ui) after executing all updates. Bob attempts to execute each possible query
in Pi to compute Qi(Ti). Note, Bob executes each query using R and M(Ui) until the
query attempts to probe a cell with an address in Caddri (U) \ T addri , probes more than 2tq
cells or finishes executing. As long as a query does not probe a cell in Ci(U) \ Ti, Bob is
able to accurately simulate the query. As a result, Bob accurately computes Qi(Ti) as well
as Γr(Qi(Ti)). Using the next ni bits, Bob decodes whether each point in Ui belongs to
Γr(Qi(Ti)). Bob decodes all ni − F points outside of Γr(Qi(Ti)) using the next (ni − F ) · d′
bits in the trivial manner. To decode the F points in Γr(Qi(Ti)), Bob will execute the queries
in Qi(Ti) in the same fixed order as Alice. Each time a new point is reported, Bob uses
the next lg ni bits to decode the point’s index in Ui completing the decoding procedure. As
Alice’s encoding starts with a 1-bit only when no two points in Ui are within distance 0.49d
′,
we know that all points in Γr(Qi(Ti)) will be reported by at least one query in Qi(Ti).
Analysis. We now analyze the expected length of Alice’s encoding. If Alice’s encoding starts with
a 0-bit, we know that Alice’s encoding is exactly 1 + nid
′ bits. Alice’s encoding starts with a 0-bit
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only when less than ni/8 points land in Γr(Qi(Ti)) or there exists two points in Ui within distance
at most 0.49d′. This occurs with probability at most 1/2 + 1/n by Lemma 3.9 and Lemma 3.2.
On the other hand, consider the case when Alice’s encoding starts with a 1-bit. In this case,
Alice’s encoding length is
1 + 2w(|Ti|+ |Ci−1(U)|+ . . . + |C0(U)|) +m+ ni + (ni − F )d′ + F lg ni.
Note, that |Ci−1(U)| + . . . + |C0(U)| = Θ(ni/β) by our choice of β = (tuw)2. We chose epochs
such that ni ≥ m2, so m = o(ni). For sufficiently large d′ > lg ni, we know that Alice’s encoding is
maximized when F = ni/8:
7nid
′
8
+
ni lg ni
8
+ o(ni lg ni).
Denote p ≤ 1/2+1/n as the probability that Alice’s encoding starts with a 0-bit. Then, Alice’s
encoding length in expectation is
p(1 + nid
′) + (1− p)
(
7nid
′
8
+
ni lg ni
8
+ o(ni lg ni)
)
which is maximized when p = 1/2 + 1/n. So, Alice’s expected encoding length is at most
15ni
16
d′ +
ni
16
lg ni + o(ni lg ni) < ni(d
′ − o(1)) = H(Ui | Caddri (U),R, u−i).
This contradicts Shannon’s source coding theorem completing the proof.
3.3 Bounding Cell Probes to All Epochs
In this section, we complete the proof of Lemma 3.5 using Lemma 3.4. Our proof for Lemma 3.5
will apply obliviousness to Lemma 3.4. The main idea is that any adversary with the ability can
view the number of probes to cells in the sets Ck−1(U), . . . , C1(U). Lemma 3.4 states that the ex-
pected running time for queries chosen uniformly at random from Pi requires probing Ω(d
′/ lg(tuw))
cells from Ci(U) with high constant probability. If queries from outside of the Pi were to probe
significantly less cells from Ci(U), the adversary can distinguish queries that lie in Pi as opposed
to those outside which would contradict the obliviousness of the data structure. We now formalize
these ideas to prove Lemma 3.5.
3.3.1 Proof of Lemma 3.5
Proof of Lemma 3.5. By Lemma 3.4, we know that if we pick a query point qi uniformly at random
from a subset of Pi, then Pr[ti(U,qi) ≥ γ(d′/ lg(tuw))] ≥ 1/2 for some constant γ and for all epochs
i ∈ {0, . . . , k− 1}. We now consider two sequences of operations which both start with U. For the
first sequence, the query qi is chosen uniformly at random from Pi. For the second sequence, the
query is chosen as any query point outside of Pi (that is q /∈ Pi).
We note that an adversary can compute the sets of cells Ck−1(U), . . . , C0(U) by simply executing
the update operations in U and keep tracking of the last time the contents of a cell were updated.
Furthermore, for any query point q, an adversary can compute ti(U, q) by simply counting the
number of probes performed to cells in the set Ci(U).
Suppose that ti(U, q) < (γ/4) · (d′/ lg(tuw)) which implies that Pr[ti(U, q) ≥ γ(d′/ lg(tuw))] ≤
1/4 by Markov’s inequality. The adversary can now apply the following distinguisher to differentiate
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the two sequences where the final query is qi chosen uniformly at random from Qi or q /∈ Qi. The
adversary computes the number of probes to cells in the set Ci(U). If the number of probes is
less than γ · (d′/ lg(tuw)), then the adversary outputs 0. Otherwise, the adversary outputs 1. As
a result, the adversary distinguishes the two sequences with probability at least 1/4 contradicting
obliviousness. If we pick the query point q such that q /∈ Pi for all epochs i ∈ {k − 1, . . . , 0}, we
apply the above result simultaneously to all epochs.
Note each epoch must contain at least min{√n,m2}. Furthermore, epochs grow geometri-
cally by a β = (tuw)
2 factor and there are Θ(n) update operations in total. So, there are
k = Θ(lg(n/m)/ lg(tuw)) epochs completing the proof.
4 Oblivious Dynamization
Let P be a decomposable problem and suppose that we have an oblivious static data structure that
solves P that holds n items which requires storage of S(n) cells, preprocessing of at most P (n) cell
probes before queries and answers queries in amortized Q(n) cell probes. The static data structure
has two functions: preprocessst and queryst. The preprocessing function, preprocessst takes as input
an encryption key Kenc and a set of items encrypted under Kenc. The output of the preprocessing
function is the data structure’s memory as well as a query key Kst. The query algorithm takes
as input the query key Kst as well as the queried argument and outputs the result as well as the
possibly updated static data structure’s memory. We assume that both the preprocessing and
queries are performed obliviously. That is, the adversary’s view of the preprocessing and queries
are independent of the underlying items and sequence of operations. Using this oblivious static
data structure in a blackbox manner, we will construct an oblivious dynamic data structure which
support updating the underlying data.
Theorem 4.1. If there exists an oblivious static data structure for a decomposable problem P of
n items with storage of Sst(n) cells, preprocessing of P st(n) cell probes and amortized Qst(n) cell
probes for queries, then there exists an oblivious dynamic data structure for P using Sdy(n) =
O(
∑lgn
i=1 S
st(2i)) cells of storage and amortized Qdy(n) = O(
∑lgn
i=1Q
st(2i)+
∑lgn
i=1
P st(2i)
2i
) cell probes
for each query/insert operation.
Proof. We assume that the oblivious dynamic data structure is initially empty and assume that
the number of operations, n, is a power of two for convenience. When n is not a power of two,
one can replace all lg n with ⌈lg n⌉ to get the correct bounds. We construct our dynamic data
structure by initializing lg n levels of geometrically increasing levels. Level i will be initialized
using an oblivious static data structure with a data set of 2i items. We will denote level i as
Li. To satisfy the requirements of obliviousness, we must hide from the adversary whether we are
performing a query or insertion operation. To do this, we simply perform both for each operation.
In particular, we will perform a query first before performing the insertion operation where exactly
one of the query or the insertion will be a fake operation. Fake insertions will insert a ⊥ and not
affect future operations while fake queries will perform an arbitrary query and ignore the result.
We now formally present our preprocessdy, querydy and insertdy algorithms.
(Kenc,Kst1 , . . . ,Kstlgn), (L1, . . . , Llgn, S1, . . . , Slgn) ← preprocessdy(). Our preprocessing algorithm
simply initializes all lg n levels to be empty and generate an encryption key.
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1. Generate encryption key Kenc.
2. For each i = 1, . . . , lg n:
(a) Set Li ←⊥.
(b) Set Ksti ←⊥.
(c) Set Si ← ∅.
r, (L1, . . . , Llgn)← querydy((q,Kst1 , . . . ,Kstlg n), (L1, . . . , Llgn)). Our query algorithm receives as in-
put a query q.
1. Set r ←⊥.
2. For each i = 1, . . . , lg n:
(a) If Li 6=⊥, then execute ri ← queryst(Ksti , q, Li).
3. Return r.
(Kst1 , . . . ,Kstlg n), (L1, . . . , Llgn, S1, . . . , Slgn) ← insertst(Kenc, x). Our insertion algorithm receives
as input the item that should be inserted x.
1. Find minimum k such that Li =⊥.
2. Set Sk ← Enc(Kenc, {x} ∪ S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sk−1).
3. Set (Lk,Kstk )← preprocessst(Kenc, Sk) where Kstk is the privacy key used to query the oblivious
static data structure.
4. For each i = 1, . . . , k − 1:
(a) Set Li ←⊥.
(b) Set Ksti ←⊥.
(c) Set Si ← ∅.
We now analyze the costs for our dynamic data structure. Note that the query algorithm
requires performing at most lg n queries to static data structures of size at most n resulting in∑lgn
i=1Q
st(2i) = O(lg n · Qst(n)) cell probes. For the insert algorithm, we perform an amortized
analysis over n queries. Level i is reconstructed every n/2i operations with P st(2i) cell probes. As
a result, the total cost over all n queries is
∑lgn
i=1 P
st(2i) · n/2i or ∑lgni=1 P st(2i)/2i amortized over
all n queries. The total storage is always at most
∑lgn
i=1 S
st(2i).
Finally, we analyze the obliviousness of our data structure. We note that the schedule of
constructing static data structures as well as querying is completely deterministic and independent
of the stored data, input arguments to operations as well as previous updates. As we assume the
queries to each static data structure and the preprocessing to construct the static data structure
are oblivious, our dynamic data structure also provides obliviousness.
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